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5 Abstract: A maintenance problem can be regarded as an optimization task, where the solution is a trade-off between the costs associated
6 with inspection and repair activities and the benefits related to the faultless operation of the infrastructure. The optimization aims at
7 minimizing the total cost while tuning some parameters, such as the number, time, and quality of inspections. Due to the unavoidable un-
8 certainties, the expected cost of maintenance and failure can only be estimated by assessing the reliability of the system. The problem is,
9 therefore, formulated as a time-variant reliability-based optimization, where both objective and constraint functions require the assess-
10 ment of reliability with time. This paper proposes an efficient general numerical technique to solve this problem by means of just one
11 single reliability analysis, while explicitly taking the diverse forms of uncertainty into account. The technique is generally applicable to
12 any problem where the ageing or damage propagation process is known by means of input-output relationships, which apply to a great
13 number of the cases. This technique exploits a Monte Carlo strategy derived from the concept of forced simulation, which significantly
14 increases the efficiency of computing the optimal solution. The efficiency and accuracy of the proposed approach is shown by means of
15 an example involving a fatigue-prone weld in a bridge girder. DOI: 10.1061/AJRUA6.0000868. © 2016 American Society of Civil
16 Engineers.
17 Author keywords: Reliability analysis; Monte Carlo simulation; Preventive maintenance; Scheduling optimization.
18 Introduction
197 Preventive maintenance practice can be extremely cost effective for
20 mitigating damage accumulation of civil infrastructures. In fact, in-
21 spection and repair activities may prevent loss of serviceability or
22 even partial collapse. However, making decisions as to whether and
23 when inspections should be performed is a very complex task be-
24 cause in real-scale engineering systems, scheduling maintenance
25 activities often involves multiple conflicting optimization criteria
26 (Zio et al. 2009). Moreover, the realistic quantification of costs as-
27 sociated with inspections, repair and failure (i.e., loss of service-
28 ability), requires the explicit consideration of the unavoidable
29 uncertainties arising from the damage-propagation process and
30 from the inspection and repair activities. Reliability-based optimi-
31 zation methods and techniques, as described, e.g., in Jensen (2002),
32 are invoked to solve the problem.
33 Due to the explicit consideration of uncertainties, the design of
34 maintenance activities is an optimization task that requires the as-
35 sessment of reliability, where number, times, and quality of inspec-
36 tions are the design variables and the total cost is the objective
37 function. For the formulation of and solution to time-dependent
38 reliability-based optimization problems, see, e.g., Patelli et al.
39 (2011) and Valdebenito and Schuëller (2010a). The assessment
40 of reliability both in the objective and in the constraint functions
41and the consideration of multiple inspections make this a stochastic
42discrete optimization problem, which is among the most compli-
43cated in the field of optimization (Wright and Nocedal 1999).
44This paper proposes a general methodology for the efficient
45solution of the time-variant reliability-based maintenance optimi-
46zation problem, which is applicable to any case in which the
47damage propagation law is known as the input-output relationship.
48The methodology is derived from the concept of forced Monte
49Carlo (MC) simulation used to evaluate the availability of plants
50(Zio and Marseguerra 2002), and it is exploited to efficiently assess
51the time-variant reliability conditional to the inspection outcomes,
52requiring only the execution of computationally inexpensive
53functions. There are no restrictions in terms of number of inspec-
54tions and number of uncertain parameters using the proposed
55methodology.
56Advantages of the Proposed Methodology
57Two main advantages are identified, which make the proposed
58methodology particularly efficient:
59• Only one full reliability analysis is required to estimate the fail-
60ure probability until the mission time (or time of interest). In
61practice, the samples are generated and evaluated on the full
62model only once to estimate the failure probability at any in-
63spection time. This turns out to be very useful because during
64the maintenance optimization process the reliability has to be
65assessed many times to find the optimal inspection time to per-
66form inspections.
67• The proposed methodology can be easily parallelized, allow-
68ing the efficient evaluation of the cost function.
69The methodology can be easily extended to also include episte-
70mic uncertainties without adding substantial computational load.
71This paper develops the basis for robust maintenance and sets the
72focus on the numerical strategy to solve the time-variant reliability-
73based optimization problem with multiple inspections.
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74 Optimization of Maintenance Costs
75 Given a system that evolves in time SðtÞ, a mission time TM, which
76 is the time until the system is required to function as specified, and
77 a number of inspections N performed at times tinsp ∈ RN , the main-
78 tenance problem is formulated as an optimization task in which
79 both objective and constraints require the evaluation of the reliabil-
80 ity, rðtÞ. Three main different costs can be identified:
81 • Manufacturing (or initial) costs, C0;
82 • Costs due to inspection and repair, CI þ CR; and
83 • Costs of failure, CF.
84 It is assumed that manufacturing costs are deterministic because
85 they are linked to construction and usage of materials. The costs
86 of repair and failure are expected values, E½·% because they are
87 obtained from the estimation of repair and failure probability, re-
88 spectively (Valdebenito and Schuëller 2010b).
89 Costs due to Inspections and Repair
90 The cost due to inspections depends on inspection quality, q, and
91 the inspection8 times, tinsp, and can be expressed as
E½CIðq; tinspÞ% ¼ cIqηðtinspÞ ð1Þ
92 where cI = fixed unit cost; and q [Eq. (3)] quantifies the quality of
93 inspections. In Eq. (1) the function
ηðtÞ ¼ 1ð1þ sÞt ð2Þ
94 is a discount function of annual interest rate, s. Eq. (2) takes into
95 account that the interests are compounded annually. For example,
96 the amount of money C invested today will be equivalent to
97 Cð1þ sÞt after t years if the interest is compounded annually,
98 where ð1þ sÞt is also called the accumulation factor. Therefore,
99 the present value of an investment done t years in the future must
100 be discounted by the amount 1=ð1þ sÞt. Costs due to repair occur
101 only if repair takes place, thus they depend on the probability of
102 repair, pRðq; tÞ, which is linked to the probability of detecting the
103 damage within an inspection, POD, which in turns depends on
104 the inspection quality, q, and on the level of damage, DðtÞ. For
105 example, as a means of controlling damage associated with crack
106 propagation, in fatigue-prone metallic components nondestructive
107 inspection (NDI) techniques can be used. NDI techniques have an
108 associated probability of detection (Zheng and Ellingwood 1998),
109 which can be modeled as
PODðtÞ ¼ ð1 − p0Þð1 − eq½f1−f2DðtÞ%Þ ð3Þ
110 where9 p0 = probability of not detecting a large crack, while f1 and
111 f2 are parameters that depend on the specific NDI technique. The
112 probability of detection is calculated as the product of two factors:
113 the probability of detecting a large crack, 1 − p0, times a coefficient
114 1 − eq½f1−f2DðtÞ% ∈ ½0; 1%, which is an increasing function of the state
115 of damage, DðtÞ. The cost of repair can thus be expressed as
E½CRðq; tinspÞ% ¼ cRpRðq; tinspÞηðtinspÞ ð4Þ
116 where cR = fixed unit cost. In some cases, the unit cost of repair can
117 be very small or sometimes negligible compared with the cost of
118 inspection. In fact, repair takes place contextually with inspection
119 and it might not require a significant additional usage of resources.
120 Costs of Failure
121 The cost of failure depends on the quality, q, as well as on the
122 state of damage, DðtÞ. Here, the expected failure cost can be
123 expressed as
E½CFðq; tinsp; tÞ% ¼ cFpFðq; tinsp; tÞ ð5Þ
124where cF = fixed unit cost associated with failure, partial collapse,
125or unavailability; and pFðq; tinsp; tÞ = failure probability, calculated
126as in the next section. The failure probability depends on both the
127inspection times, tinsp, and on the time when the reliability is
128assessed.
129Total Costs
130The total cost, therefore, is
E½CT % ¼ C0 þ E½CIðq; tinspÞ% þ E½CRðq; tinspÞ% þ E½CFðq; tinsp; tÞ%
ð6Þ
131while the total cost of maintenance is
E½CM% ¼ E½CIðq; tinspÞ% þ E½CRðq; tinspÞ% þ E½CFðq; tinsp; tÞ% ð7Þ
132Formulation of the Optimization Problem
133The maintenance problem can be generally formulated as a con-
134strained optimization problem in which the constraint represents
135the limit state safety level with which the system has to comply.
136Here, the following formulation of the optimization problem is
137considered:
minimize
q∈Rþ;tinsp∈½0;TM %N
E½CMðq; tinsp; tÞ%
subject to pFðq; tinsp; tÞ ≤ pcriticF ð8Þ
138where pcriticF is determined by a prescribed limit state safety level.
139The problem of Eq. (8) is addressed using the penalty function
ψðcÞ ¼ 1 − eαjminð0;cÞj ð9Þ
140which is a function of the constraint
c ¼ − log½pFðq; tinsp; tÞ% þ logðpcriticF Þ ð10Þ
141where the 10constraint is satisfied if c > 0. The problem of
142Eq. (8) can thus be reformulated into an equivalent unconstrained
143problem as
minimize
q∈Rþ;tinsp∈½0;TM %N
E½CMðq; tinsp; tÞ% þ gψðcÞ ð11Þ
144where g = penalty factor, which value can be chosen knowing the
145order of magnitude of the minimum value of the objective function.
146Time-Variant Reliability and Failure Probability
147Assessment
148The damage can be expressed as a function, 1D ¼ Dðθ; tÞ ¼ DθðtÞ,
149of some input parameters θ, that can be used to quantify the level of
150damage. For example, damage may manifest in the form of fatigue,
151where the model is represented by the Paris-Erdogan’s law (Paris
152and Erdogan 1963), and θ includes the initial crack length (initial
153condition), the stress range, the shape factors, the crack length ratio,
154and any other coefficients of the damage law. The time-variant
155reliability is obtained via definition of a critical threshold of
156damage, Dthresθ , as
rðtÞ ¼ 1 − P½DθðtÞ ≥ Dthresθ % ð12Þ
157where the threshold, Dthresθ , and the damage level, DθðtÞ, represent
158the capacity and the demand of the system, respectively. BothDthresθ
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159 and DθðtÞ are uncertain quantities with associated probability
160 distribution functions. The time-variant reliability is obtained as
rðtÞ ¼ 1 −
Z
Dðθ;tÞ≥Dthres
hðθÞdθ ð13Þ
161 where h = joint density function of the random parameters θ.
162 For simplicity, the capacity Dthresθ has been included in the vector
163 of parameters, θ. By means of the Monte Carlo method the time-
164 variant failure probability, pFðtÞ, can be calculated as
pFðtÞ ¼
Z ∞
−∞
· · ·
Z ∞
−∞
Iðθ; tÞhðθÞdθ ð14Þ
165 where Iðθ; tÞ ∈ f0; 1g = indicator function, which is 1 only if
166 Dðθ; tÞ ≥ Dthres.
167 Formulation of the Maintenance Problem
168 The maintenance problem requires the evaluation of the reliability,
169 rðtÞ, over the period of time, t ∈ ½0;TM%. With no inspections
170 (N ¼ 0), the problem can be solved by assessing the reliability as
171 in Eq. (13). When inspections are considered, i.e., N > 0, the reli-
172 ability of the system is conditional on the inspection outcomes.
173 In fact, after an inspection the system or component can be regen-
174 erated as repair activities may take place. Therefore, the inspection
175 outcomes and eventual repair need to be taken into account by com-
176 puting the conditional reliability.
177 The optimal inspection time is naturally between the following
178 two limiting cases. If inspections are performed too early, tinsp ≪
179 TM, nearly no damage will be found, and hence no repair will take
180 place. As a consequence the reliability will only be improved mar-
181 ginally, or even not improved at all. On the other side, if inspections
182 are done too late, tinsp ≃ TM, the probability of detection would be
183 large (because directly related to the level of damage), but it is
184 likely that the system will have already failed, thus the inspection
185 will not be effective. The reliability is a function of two different
186 times: the actual time t, when the reliability is assessed, and the
187 inspection time, tinsp, when the inspections have been performed.
188 In general, i.e., when N inspections are considered, the reliability is
189 given by the conditional probability
rðtÞ ¼ 1 − P½DðtÞ ≥ Dthresjtinsp1 < tinsp2 < : : : tinspN < t% ð15Þ
190 Here, the focus is on assessing the reliability at a fixed time
191 point, for example at the mission time t ¼ TM.
192 Assumptions
193 In order to illustrate the procedure, two assumptions are consid-
194 ered for simplicity, but without restricting the generality of the
195 approach:
196 • It is assumed that any inspection is followed by only two out-
197 comes: either the flaw is detected or it is not. If a flaw is detected
198 repair takes place, which is assumed to be perfect, i.e., after
199 repair DðtinspÞ ¼ 0. In other words, if a component is repaired,
200 it is assumed that further chances of failure for that specific com-
201 ponent are zero.
202 • Only preventive maintenance is considered. If the critical thresh-
203 old is exceeded at the time of inspection, the component cannot
204 be repaired. That is, if failure has occurred, repair actions will
205 not take place.
206 Repair and failure events are closely related because they are
207 both linked to the state of damage. For instance, if the damage
208 is close to the critical threshold, it is very likely that either the
209failure or the repair event occurs. These assumptions can be easily
210relaxed.
211Classification of Events and Total Failure Probability
212In order to calculate the reliability as defined in Eq. (15), mutually
213exclusive events are classified and combined. Among all of the
214possible events four main classes are identified:
215• The failure events, Fi ¼ ½Dðtinspi Þ > Dthres%, at the time of the ith
216inspection;
217• The failure event, Ft ¼ ½DðtÞ > Dthres%, at the evaluation time t;
218• The repair or detection event, Ri ¼ ½δðtinspi Þ ¼ 1%, at the time
219of the ith inspection; and
220• The event Ri ¼ ½δðtinspi Þ ¼ 0%, i.e., the event of nonrepair or
221nondetection.
222where δ is a binary random variable to characterize the outcome of
223inspections as will be explained in the next section.
224The failure event, F, given thatN inspections are performed, can
225be expressed by means of set operations (of union and intersection)
226among events.
227The failure event is represented as a combination of mutually
228exclusive events
F ¼ ∪Nþ1
j¼1
!
ðFN−jþ2 ∩ FN−jþ1Þ ∩ ∩
N−jþ1
k¼0
Rk
"
ð16Þ
229where 1for simplified notation, the event FNþ1 ≡ Ft is put equal to
230the failure event at the evaluation time. In Eq. (16), the intersection
231of consecutive failure events is
Fiþ1 ∩ Fi ¼ ½Dðtinspiþ1Þ > DthresANDDðtinspi Þ < Dthres% ð17Þ
232In Eq. (16), it is assumed that any event where the subscript is
233≤0 is the empty set ∅. So, for example, the event Rk obtained for
234k ¼ 0 is the empty set R0 ≡ ∅.
235The consideration of mutually exclusive events, as shown
236in Eq. (16), leads to the general expression of the total failure
237probability
P½F% ¼
XNþ1
j¼1
P
!
FN−jþ2 ∩ ðFN−jþ1Þ%
YN−jþ1
k¼0
P½ðRkÞ
"
ð18Þ
238where again for simplicity, the summation goes from 1 to N þ 1 to
239include the failure event at the time of observation Ft ≡ FNþ1.
240Eq. (18) could be analytically solved only if both the damage-
241propagation law of Eq. (3) and the detection probability function
242of Eq. (3) had a closed-form solution. However, in general, this is
243not available because the damage-propagation equation is often
244implicitly solved (for example, using a step forward integration
245approach), thus the probability of Eq. (18) has to be calculated
246numerically.
247Efficient Forced Monte Carlo Strategy
248The computation of reliability is usually associated with quite a
249significant computational effort. Among the numerical methods
250proposed in literature, MC simulation methods (Liu 2001;
251Metropolis and Ulam 1949) are generally applicable but require
252a compromise between efficiency and accuracy. Many variants
253of the MC method can be found in literature (Zio and Marseguerra
2542002; Schuëller and Pradlwarter 2007), such as line sampling (de
255Angelis et al. 2015), importance sampling (Au and Beck 1999), and
256subset simulation (Au and Patelli 2015), which make the MC
257method more efficient and accurate. Advanced simulation is an
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258 essential component of the proposed development to ensure
259 efficiency.
260 The present numerical strategy is derived from the concept of
261 forced MC simulation described in Zio and Marseguerra (2002).
262 The strategy is based on the computation of weights, w, which ac-
263 count for the probability of detection and can be computed at any
264 inspection time by reusing the results from the same reliability
265 analysis.
266 Direct Monte Carlo Approach
267 One way to solve the problem formulated in Eq. (18) is by perform-
268 ing a direct MC simulation.
269 One Inspection (N ! 1)
270 A binary variable, δθðtÞ, to characterize the outcomes of inspections
271 is introduced. The variable has the following mass function:
δθðtÞ ¼
!
1ðsuccessÞ λDðtÞ
0ðfailureÞ 1 − λDðtÞ
ð19Þ
272 where λD ¼ POD½DθðtÞ% is the likelihood of detecting the flaw dur-
273 ing inspection.
274 The total time-variant failure probability is computed by means
275 of MC as
pFðtÞ ¼ lim
NS→∞
1
NS
XNS
s¼1
Z þ∞
0
fδθðt1ÞfsgIðθ; t1Þ
þ ½1 − δθðt1Þfsg%Iðθ; tÞghðθÞdθ ð20Þ
276 where13 t1 ¼ tinsp1 , and δθðt1Þfsg ∈ f0; 1g simulates the outcome of
277 the first inspection for the fsgth sample. The indicator function
278 in Eq. (20) is
Iðθ; tÞ ¼
!
1; if DqðtÞ ≥ Dthres
0; otherwise
ð21Þ
279 An extract of the pseudocode that computes the integrand of
280 Eq. (20) is shown in Fig. 1.
281 The total time-variant failure probability estimator is computed
282 by averaging over a large number of samples, NS, as
pˆFðtÞ ¼ 1NS
XNS
s¼1
fδθðt1ÞfsgIðθfsg; t1Þ þ ½1 − δθðt1Þfsg%Iðθfsg; tÞg
ð22Þ
283Multiple Inspections (N > 1)
284The method can be extended to multiple inspections as a derivation
285of Eq. (18). Let δfsg ¼ δθðt1Þfsg; : : : ; δθðtNÞfsg be the vector of
286inspection outcomes for the fsgth sample. The total time-variant
287failure probability can be calculated as
pFðtÞ ¼ lim
NS→∞
1
NS
XNS
s¼1
Z þ∞
0
!XN
i¼1
½1−
"
1− δfsgi
#
Iðθ; tiÞIðθ; tiþ1Þ%
×
Yi−1
k¼0
ð1− δfsgk Þþ Iðθ; tÞ
YN
k¼1
"
1− δfsgk
#$
hðθÞdθ ð23Þ
288where 14the time tNþ1 coincides with the evaluation time as tNþ1 ¼ t,
289and for k ¼ 0 the variable δfsgk¼0 ¼ 0. The integrand of Eq. (23) can
290be easily coded by means of nested “if” statements, as shown in the
291pseudo-code of Fig. 2.
292The estimator is computed, again, by averaging over a large,
293albeit finite, number of samples, NS, as
pˆFðtÞ ¼ 1NS
XNS
s¼1
!XN
i¼1
½1−
"
1− δfsgi
#
Iðθfsg; tiÞIðθfsg; tiþ1Þ%
×
Yi−1
k¼0
ð1− δfsgk ÞþIðθfsg; tÞ
YN
k¼1
"
1− δfsgk
#$
ð24Þ
294Forced Monte Carlo Simulation Approach
295Here, a numerical approach is proposed to calculate the reliability
296conditional to inspections without simulating the inspection out-
297comes. This constitutes a great advantage because, unlike in the
298direct case, it is no longer necessary to run a full reliability analysis
299for every inspection time.
300One Inspection (N ! 1)
301The strategy can be derived from Eq. (20), noting that the random
302variable δðt1Þfsg can be averaged before the integral is calculated,
303as
F1:1 Fig. 1. Pseudocode for the failure probability estimator of Eq. (22),
F1:2 case with N ¼ 1
F2:1Fig. 2. Pseudocode for the failure probability estimator of Eq. (22) for
F2:2the case of multiple inspections (N > 1)
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pFðtÞ ¼
Z þ∞
0
lim
NS→∞
1
NS
XNS
s¼1
fδðt1ÞfsgIðθ; t1Þ
þ ½1 − δðt1Þfsg&Iðθ; tÞghðθÞdθ ð25Þ
304 which15 is equivalent to averaging over the inspection outcomes
305 before the reliability analysis is actually performed. Subsequently,
306 the limit is equal to the expected value of the detection prob-
307 ability as
wðtÞ ¼ lim
NS→∞
1
NS
XNS
s¼1
δðtÞfsg ¼ POD½Dðθ; tÞ& ð26Þ
308 By introducing the weight w from Eq. (26), the total time-variant
309 failure probability becomes
pFðtÞ ¼
Z þ∞
0
fwðt1ÞIðθ; t1Þ þ ½1 − wðt1Þ&Iðθ; tÞghðθÞdθ ð27Þ
310 and the MC estimator is
pˆFðtÞ ¼ 1NS
XNS
s¼1
fwˆðt1ÞIðθfsg; t1Þ þ ½1 − wˆðt1Þ&Iðθfsg; tÞg ð28Þ
311 The weight, w, is the relative frequency (relative to the number
312 of runs NS) by which the logical statement of Fig. 1 if δ ¼ 1 returns
313 true response. This relative frequency, for NS →∞ converges to
314 the likelihood of detection λDðt1Þ ¼ POD½Dðθ; t1Þ&.
315 Multiple Inspections (N > 1)
316 The approach is generalized to multiple inspections by computing
317 the detection weights from Eq. (26) by referring to the ith inspec-
318 tion as
wi ¼ lim
NS→∞
1
NS
XNS
s¼1
δfsgi ¼ POD½Dðθ; tiÞ& ð29Þ
319 Again, by averaging over the inspection outcomes before the
320 integral of Eq. (23) and substituting the weights of Eqs. (29)
321 and (23) it becomes
pFðtÞ ¼
Z þ∞
0
!XN
i¼1
Iðθ; tiÞ½1 − ð1 − wiÞIðθ; tiþ1Þ&
×
Yi−1
k¼0
ð1 − wkÞ þ Iðθ; tÞ
YN
k¼1
ð1 − wkÞ
"
hðθÞdθ ð30Þ
322 where for16 simplified notation tNþ1 ≡ t. The probability estimator is
323 obtained as
pˆFðtÞ ¼ 1NS
XNS
s¼1
!XN
i¼1
Iðθfsg; tiÞ½1 − ð1 − wˆiÞIðθfsg; tiþ1Þ&
×
Yi−1
k¼0
ð1 − wˆkÞ þ Iðθfsg; tÞ
YN
k¼1
ð1 − wˆkÞ
"
ð31Þ
324 An alternative and more efficient way to compute Eq. (31),
325 which can be vectorized and hence computed without a for loop
326 over the number of samples NS, is
pˆFðtÞ ¼ 1NS
XNS
s¼1
!
Iðθfsg; tÞ
YN
j¼1
1 − wˆj½1 − Iðθfsg; tjÞ&
"
ð32Þ
327Total and Partial Probability of Repair
328By means of the direct approach, the probability of repair can be
329calculated for the ith inspection as
pRi ¼ limNS→∞
1
NS
XNS
s¼1
Yi
k¼1
δfsgk ð33Þ
330Again, by inverting the order of summation and product
331sequence, the probability of repair for the ith inspection can be
332estimated as
pRi ¼ limNS→∞
Yi
k¼1
1
NS
XNS
s¼1
δfsgk ¼
Yi
k¼1
E½wk& ð34Þ
333The estimator for the total probability of repair, i.e., after all the
334inspections have been performed, is obtained with a finite sample
335set as
pˆR ¼
YN
k¼1
wˆk ð35Þ
336Accuracy of the Proposed Forced Monte Carlo Method
337Forced Monte Carlo strategies are ultimately deployed to increase
338the efficiency of the analysis given a certain accuracy. The MC
339estimators of Eqs. (24) and (31) are unbiased. The variance of
340the estimator of Eq. (32) for a fixed number of inspections, N,
341is directly related to the variance of the estimated failure probability
342with zero inspections at time t. For example, considering one in-
343spection, N ¼ 1, the variance of the probability estimator can be
344calculated as
Var½pˆF& ¼ Var½I t& þ E½w21&ðE½I t& − E½I1&Þ
þ E½w1&2ðE½I1&2 − E½I t&2Þ ð36Þ
345where 17I t ¼ Iðθfsg; tÞ is the indicator function of Eq. (32). There-
346fore, the variance of the estimator of the total failure probability is
347directly related to I t ¼ pF0ðtÞ, which is the variance of the es-
348timator of the failure probability with zero inspections at time t.
349This comes with the advantage that pF0ðtÞ is usually very large
350and therefore very few samples are necessary to achieve a high
351accuracy.
352Numerical Example
353In this section a welded connection of a bridge girder is analyzed.
354Due to cyclic loading, metallic components tend to develop fatigue
355cracks. As these cracks propagate, the structural system accumu-
356lates damage that may lead to loss of serviceability or even to col-
357lapse, which are followed by considerable monetary losses.
358The welded connection between a web stiffener and the gird-
359er’s flange is studied (Fig. 3). It is assumed that due to stress
360concentration, a crack appears at the weld’s toe. The crack propa-
361gation phenomenon is modelled using the Paris-Erdogan law by
362means of
da
dT
¼ CðΔKÞm ð37Þ
363This example has been previously studied in Lukic and
364Cremona (2001) and Patelli et al. (2013).
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365 Uncertainties
366 The aspect ratio between crack width and depth is assumed to be
367 a=c ¼ 0.6. The initial crack length a0 is given as a lognormal
368 random variable of mean μ ¼ 2.0 mm and standard deviation
369 σ ¼ 0.4 mm. In this example, time is expressed as the number
370 of fatigue cycles, which can be translated into physical time as
371 the load time pattern is identified. The mission time is TM ¼
372 2.5 × 106 cycles. For the critical crack length, ac, a Gumbel
373 distribution is considered, while for the parameters of the Paris
374 law, m and lnC, normal distributions are considered. A detailed
375justification of the formulated assumptions on the preceding prob-
376ability distributions can be found in Lukic and Cremona (2001).
377Numerical values, distribution functions, and units are provided
378for all parameters in Table 1.
379Estimation of Total Failure Probability with One Inspection
380When just one single inspection is performed, the problem can
381be visualized, as shown in Fig. 4. The time-variant failure proba-
382bility is computed with one inspection performed at time tinsp ¼
3831.5 × 106. For the purpose of illustration, Fig. 4 is produced with
384the uncertainty assigned to the initial crack length, a0, only. This is
385done to better visualize the curves of Fig. 4 and actually see the
386curves corresponding to each single simulation beyond the speci-
387fied critical threshold. The rest of the numerical example is solved
388with uncertainties defined as in Table 1. The reliability analysis
389generates a bundle of curves (Fig. 4), where each curve is obtained
390solving the crack-growth equation for each sample.
391Fig. 4 illustrates the procedure to calculate the weights using
392the forced Monte Carlo simulation approach. Fig. 4(a) shows the
393probability of detection (x-axis) as a function of the level of dam-
394age. For every sample of the reliability analysis a curve of the level
395of damage, a, is plotted as a function of time. At the end of the
396reliability analysis the graph in Fig. 4(b) is obtained. In order to
397calculate the weights, a line is drawn through both graphs corre-
398sponding to the POD at time t ¼ 1.5 × 106. The picked curve in
399Fig. 4(b) is tracked with probability 1 until inspection occurs. Fol-
400lowing inspection there are two possible states with associated
401probabilities: either the detection is successful (with probability
4020.72) and the damage is removed aðt ≥ tinspÞ ¼ 0, or the detection
403fails and the damage keeps growing until the evaluation time
404t ¼ 2.5 × 106. The probability of nondetection (0.28) is the weight
405to be assigned to the sample under consideration. The procedure is
b
d
a
c
F3:1 Fig. 3. Structural detail and crack
Table 1. Numerical Values, Units, and Distribution Functions for the Input and Model Parameters of the Numerical Example
T1:1 θi E½θi% Var½θi% Distribution Units Description
T1:2 a0 2.0 0.42 Lognormal mm Initial crack length
T1:3 ac 15 0.0252 Gumbel mm Critical threshold
T1:4 m 2.4 0.0242 Normal — Exponent of Eq. (37)
T1:5 C 2 × 10−10 ð10−12Þ2 Lognormal mm=cycles Coefficient of Eq. (37)
T1:6 Δσ 30 0.12 Gamma MPa Fatigue stress range
T1:7 a=c 0.6 0 Deterministic — Crack shape
T1:8 p0 0.02 0 Deterministic — POD’s factor
T1:9 fs 0.1 0 Deterministic 1=mm POD’s factor
(a) (b)
F4:1 Fig. 4. Diagram for the calculation of weights and failure probability conditional to the outcome of one inspection
© ASCE 6 ASCE-ASME J. Risk Uncertainty Eng. Syst., Part A: Civ. Eng.
P
R
O
O
F
O
N
L
Y
406 then repeated for every curve that fails at the evaluation time (18 thick
407 lines), except for those curves that have already failed at the inspec-
408 tion time, which samples are given weight w ¼ 1. The chronologi-
409 cal flow pursued to calculate the weights and to obtain the failure
410 probability is represented in Fig. 5
411 The total failure event at the time of observation, as shown in
412 Fig. 5, is obtained as
F ¼ F1 ∪ ðFt ∩ F1jR¯Þ ð38Þ
413 and, consequently, the total failure probability can be calculated as
P½F% ¼ P½F1% þ P½Ft ∩ F1%P½R¯% ð39Þ
414 where P½R¯% ¼ 1 − w is the probability of nondetection or nonrep-
415 air; and Ft ¼ ½aðtÞ > ac% is the failure event at the evaluation time.
416 The value of total failure probability obtained from Fig. 5
417 is P½F1% þ P½Ft ∩ F1%P½R¯% ¼ 0.002þ 0.014 ¼ 0.016.
418 Design of Maintenance Strategies with One and Two
419 Inspections
420 The optimization is formulated as in “19 Optimization of Maintenance
421 Costs,” where the inspection time tinsp and the inspection quality q
422 are the design variables of the problem. The input unit costs of
423 maintenance and failure are reported in Table 2.
424 Fig. 6 shows how the total cost displays on a graph as a function
425 of the inspection time because the inspection quality is fixed as
426 q ¼ 1. Although the cost of failure may appear quite smooth, every
427 point of the curve is obtained by estimating the failure probability
428 and therefore it is associated with an, albeit small, estimation error.
429 The curve of failure cost shows a typical concave shape. The mini-
430 mum is located at tinsp' ¼ 2.0 · 106. The minimum total cost is
431 slightly shifted because the cost of inspection decreases with the
432 inspection time. The cost of repair is very small compared to
433 the other costs (Fig. 6).
434 With two inspections, the total cost is represented on a time grid,
435 where every point corresponds to a pair (tinspi , t
insp
j ). The resulting
436 graph is the surface in Fig. 7. The minimum total cost identifies the
437 pair tinsp' ¼ ð1.875106; 2.085106Þ when the two inspections should
438be performed. Fig. 8 shows the costs of repair, which are signifi-
439cantly smaller compared to the total costs.
440Solution to the Constrained Cost Optimization with N
441Inspections
442It is recalled that the number of design variables is N þ 1 because
443the inspection quality q is assumed to be equal for all inspections.
F5:1 Fig. 5. Tree chart for the calculation of the failure probability conditional to the outcome of one inspection
Table 2. Unit Cost Used in the Numerical Example
T2:1 Cost Value Description
T2:2 cI 30,000 Unit cost of inspection
T2:3 cR 500 Unit cost of repair
T2:4 cF 2 × 105 Unit cost of failure
T2:5 r 0.05 Discount rate
F6:1Fig. 6. Curves of cost obtained fixing the quality of inspection to q ¼ 1
0.5
1
1.5
2
10 4
E[
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]
1
2.5
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6
 cycles]
2.50.5 2
Ti  [10
6
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1.510.50 0
F7:1Fig. 7. Total costs surface with two inspections N ¼ 2
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444 The solution to this problem is found using a genetic algorithm
445 (GA) (Goldberg 2006). The choice of GA is justified by the sto-
446 chastic nature of the objective function and constraint, which do not
447 behave as smooth functions. As a consequence, information about
448 the derivatives on both objective and constraint cannot be exploited,
449 and, moreover, the presence of narrow spikes, albeit on a small
450 scale, makes ineffective the use of any derivative-based optimizers.
451 Any other optimizer that does not make use of derivatives could
452 have been used alternatively. Results from the constrained optimi-
453 zation as the number of inspections increases are obtained fixing
454 the critical failure probability to pcriticF ¼ 10−3. The variance of
455 the estimator changes from case to case, depending on the failure
456 probability target, however, for this problem it can be associated
457 with a coefficient of variation (COV) approximately equal to
458 10−3. The computational cost of performing a complete analysis
459 is directly related to the total number of samples, NS. With the pro-
460 posed approach, the number of samples required by the reliability
461 analysis only, nS, is decoupled from the optimization procedure. In
462 this way the optimizer does not need to sample from the full model
463 to proceed with the iterations and the total number of samples is
464 NS ¼ nS. On the contrary, using a plain Monte Carlo approach,
465the number of samples is given by NS ¼ N · Nopt · nS, where
466Nopt is the number of objective (total cost) function evaluations
467and N is the number of inspections. In fact, with such an approach,
468every objective function evaluation requires as many reliability
469analyses as the number of inspections, making the plain Monte
470Carlo approach ever more inefficient as the number of inspections
471grows. Results of Table 3 are obtained with the forced Monte Carlo
472approach using NS ¼ nS¼ 105 in total. With the plain approach,
473using nS¼ 105, a complete cost-benefit analysis would have re-
474quired NS ¼ N · Nopt · 105, where the number of objective evalu-
475ations in this case required by the optimizer is approximately
476Nopt ≃ 2.5 × 103. Therefore, depending on how many inspections
477are performed (N), the total number of samples required by the
478plain approach can be as large as NS ≃ 1010. Provided the failure
479probability with zero inspections at time t is approximately
480pF0 ≃ 0.15, the coefficient of variation of the probability estimator
481can approximated using Eq. (36) neglecting the second and third
482terms of the left-hand side. Given the number of samples used in the
483reliability analysis nS¼ 105, the coefficient of variation of the es-
484timator is approximately COV ≃ ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃð1 − pˆF0Þ=ðnSpˆF0Þp ¼ 0.001,
485which is a very accurate estimation.
48620Table 3 shows that there is no sensible decrease in the total cost
487of maintenance as the number of inspections increases. There is
488nearly no difference between optima obtained with two, three, four,
489five, six, and seven inspections, which makes these 21four options
490equally suitable. However, the optimum quality decreases from
491two to seven inspections, which means that at the same total cost,
492less expensive inspection techniques could be used. Performing
493more than seven inspections does not bring an appreciable reduc-
494tion to the total cost, thus there is no advantage in increasing
495the number of inspections beyond seven unless a smaller critical
496value of failure probability is fixed. In Table 3, results obtained with
497one inspection are omitted because the required constraint is not
498satisfied.
499It is also interesting to see how the total costs drastically de-
500crease as the constraint is removed from the optimization compared
501with the price of much larger failure probabilities (Table 4). By
502removing the failure probability constraint (pcriticF < 10
−3), the total
503cost of maintenance decreases by a factor of ∼10. From Table 4, it
504can also be seen that when no constraint is imposed, the total cost
505does not sensibly change as the number of inspections increases.
1
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1
10.5 0.5
0 0
F8:1 Fig. 8. Repair cost surface with two inspections N ¼ 2
Table 3. Minimum Total Costs and Associated Arguments as the Number of Inspections Increases for the Case pthresF ¼ 10−3
T3:1 N pˆF minCM q$ t
insp$
1 t
insp$
2 t
insp$
3 t
insp$
4 t
insp$
5 t
insp$
N
T3:2 2 9.55 × 10−4 1.35 × 105 4.47 2.75 × 106 3.39 × 106 — — — —
T3:3 3 7.21 × 10−4 1.18 × 105 2.68 1.73 × 106 1.83 × 106 1.95 × 106 — — —
T3:4 4 9.33 × 10−4 1.11 × 105 1.95 1.62 × 106 1.83 × 106 2.00 × 106 2.22 × 106 — —
T3:5 5 9.00 × 10−4 1.34 × 105 1.94 1.71 × 106 1.88 × 106 2.03 × 106 2.06 × 106 2.13 × 106 —
T3:6 6 9.32 × 10−4 1.11 × 105 1.31 1.71 × 106 1.78 × 106 1.84 × 106 1.96 × 106 2.10 × 106 2.36 × 106
T3:7 7 7.44 × 10−4 1.11 × 105 1.12 1.48 × 106 1.76 × 106 1.83 × 106 1.95 × 106 1.99 × 106 : : : 2.32 × 106
T3:8 8 8.19 × 10−4 1.73 × 105 1.61 1.46 × 106 1.75 × 106 1.99 × 106 2.05 × 106 2.21 × 106 : : : 2.49 × 106
T3:9 9 9.70 × 10−4 1.72 × 105 1.44 1.63 × 106 1.85 × 106 1.89 × 106 2.08 × 106 2.25 × 106 : : : 2.35 × 106
T3:10 10 9.10 × 10−4 1.36 × 105 0.99 1.60 × 106 1.83 × 106 1.84 × 106 2.00 × 106 2.06 × 106 : : : 2.33 × 106
Table 4. Minimum Total Costs and Associated Arguments as the Number of Inspections Increases for the Unconstrained Case (pthresF ¼ 1)
T4:1 N pˆF minCM q$ t
insp$
1 t
insp$
2 t
insp$
3 t
insp$
4
T4:2 1 2.15 × 10−1 3.43 × 104 1.35 2.07 × 106 — — —
T4:3 2 1.32 × 10−1 3.33 × 104 0.85 1.92 × 106 2.06 × 106 — —
T4:4 3 1.21 × 10−1 3.36 × 104 0.56 1.94 × 106 2.04 × 106 2.07 × 106 —
T4:5 4 2.70 × 10−1 3.67 × 104 0.28 1.55 × 106 1.69 × 106 2.02 × 106 2.05 × 106
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506 However, as in the constrained case, a greater number of inspec-
507 tions may allow reducing the quality to the same total maintenance
508 cost.
509 Within the proposed framework and when N is large, inspec-
510 tions can be performed quite early. This is justified by the fact that
511 the time zero is a relative time and does not necessarily coincide
512 with a newly crafted component. This is in line with the underlying
513 fracture mechanics model adopted to predict the crack length of the
514 components, which assumes a crack initiation process. Results
515 from the numerical example show how the number of inspections,
516 N, does not significantly influence the minimum total cost. How-
517 ever, a change in the inspection quality from N ¼ 2 to N ¼ 4 can
518 be appreciated, meaning that less expensive inspection techniques
519 can be used at the same total cost. Results from the optimization
520 also show that there is no significant advantage in performing more
521 than seven inspections because the total cost slightly increases and
522 the optimal quality does not change in value. By looking at the
523 results from the unconstrained case, similar conclusions can be
524 drawn because the total cost does not change and the inspection
525 quality decreases with the number of inspections.
526 Conclusions
527 The solution to the maintenance problem is a trade-off between
528 costs associated with inspection and repair activities and benefits
529 related to the faultless operation of the infrastructure. The mainte-
530 nance of a system is a complex engineering task, where the esti-
531 mation of costs requires the consideration of heterogeneous
532 uncertainties arising from the damage propagation process and
533 from the inspection and repair activities. The maintenance problem
534 is turned into an optimization problem, which is regarded as a sto-
535 chastic and discrete optimization problem, involving significant
536 computational cost.
537 A general and efficient methodology for the robust design of
538 maintenance plans has been presented. The methodology exploits
539 the concept of forced MC simulation to maximize the efficiency
540 without reducing its accuracy. The strategy makes use of the com-
541 putation of weights that emulate the outcomes of the preventive
542 maintenance. The strategy is capable of assessing the reliability
543 of the system at any given time and for any number of inspections,
544 performing only one full reliability analysis, whose results can sub-
545 sequently be used with nearly no additional computational effort.
546 The computational efficiency is directly related to the number of
547 samples required to complete the optimization. The number of sam-
548 ples used by the proposed approach equalizes the number of sam-
549 ples required to complete a single reliability analysis, NS ¼ nS. A
550 plain Monte Carlo approach would instead require many more sam-
551 ples NS ¼ N · Nopt · nS, where N is the number of inspections and
552 Nopt is the number of objective function evaluations.
553 The proposed methodology has been derived from a direct
554 Monte Carlo strategy and therefore has no limitations in terms
555of number of uncertain variables. Moreover, it is easy to implement
556and parallelize, allowing its application to real-scale systems of in-
557dustrial interest. The numerical strategy has been implemented in
22558OpenCossan (Patelli et al. 2014) making it directly accessible and
559applicable for industrial research.
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